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Abstract 
Using a panel of Chinese firms over the period 2003-2013, we show that, from the 
supply-side perspective, as a result of the implementation of the economic stimulus package 
in China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received more bank loans and invested more than 
non-SOEs. We further find that after the implementation of the economic stimulus package, 
bank lending became less responsive to firm profitability and firm investments became less 
responsive to investment opportunities for SOEs, non-SOEs from favoured industries and 
regions, and non-SOEs with political connections. Overall, our findings support the view that 
the stimulus package and the associated increase in bank loan supply in China resulted in 
more resources being allocated to SOEs.  
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1. Introduction 
Major countries that suffered during the recent global financial crisis have launched 
economic stimulus packages whose main purpose is to restore economic growth
1
. Following 
Keynesian economic theory, the aim of these economic stimulus packages is to encourage 
firms to increase investment behaviour, and thus expansionary monetary policy is usually 
implemented by the monetary authority, which results in a significant increase of bank loan 
supply in the supply side. However, literature on the effectiveness of the economic stimulus 
package and the associated expansionary monetary policy mainly focuses on their effect on 
the macro-economy, such as GDP and employment (Cai et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2014); it is 
still a controversial issue whether and how the micro-economy is influenced by those 
stimulus packages, particularly as there is still no evidence about whether and how bank 
lending and firm investment decisions changed following the expansionary monetary policy. 
This issue is important because it has been observed that the stimulus package boosted 
economic growth, but it is unknown whether the growth is sound and sustainable. One way of 
testing this is to examine whether the increased bank loan supply is allocated to different 
types of firms fairly and how these firms make their investment decisions following the 
implementation of the stimulus package. Compared to mature markets whose stimulus 
package is usually market-oriented, with well-designed mechanisms to guarantee its 
implementation, the stimulus package in emerging markets may be more government-
oriented, especially in China, where the government still controls a large number of firms and 
the banking system, which raises the issue of whether Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) have equal access to the increased bank loan 
supply and investment opportunities. The investment decisions made by Chinese firms 
following the implementation of the stimulus package, and the excess capacity problem 
caused by these investments, have attracted increasing media attention recently
2
, but there is 
still a lack of empirical evidence at the firm level to support this argument. This study aims to 
fill this gap by providing fresh evidence on this issue using a sample of Chinese listed firms. 
The effectiveness of bank lending through the government-owned banking system has 
been widely documented in the literature. Though some studies support the political view by 
claiming that the lending behaviour and credit allocation of government lending may be 
                                                          
1
 For example, the US government announced a $700 billion stimulus package in 2008 and bailed out 
financially distressed financial institutions. The Japanese government announced a first round stimulus package 
in 2010 of $915 billion Japanese yen and a second round stimulus package $880 billion Japanese yen in 2012. 
Other countries also implemented their respectively stimulus packages, including Germany and France. 
2
 See http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinas-excess-capacity-problem-2013-6 
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distorted with low efficiency due to political interventions (Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Sapienza, 2004), others argue that government lending can cure market failure and 
improve welfare by providing more capital (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011). Empirical 
evidence suggests that the beneficial effects of government bank lending can be valuable 
during periods of financial crisis (Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Tong and Wei, 2012; Chen 
et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014). All of these studies, though focusing on different aspects, 
explicitly mention that the government-owned banking system does have an influence on 
bank lending and firm investment activities because the government is able to control the 
bank loan supply better under this system.  
Meanwhile, another strand of literature has noticed and explored the relevance of bank 
loan supply shocks for firms’ financing and investment decisions, which depend on firms’ 
ability to access external finance. For example, Leary (2009) provides evidence that 
following an expansion (contraction) of bank loan supply, the bank loan ratio of small, bank-
dependent firms significantly increases (decreases) relative to that of large, less bank-
dependent firms, because small, bank-dependent firms are less likely to switch between 
public and private debt markets. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that net debt issuances 
decline significantly following contraction in the supply of bank credit. Shen et al. (2014) 
find that the economic stimulus package in China leads to better access to bank loans for 
large and SOEs relative to small and private firms. In addition, existing evidence also shows 
that shifts in bank loan supply helps to determine corporate investment, depending on firms’ 
availability of alternative external finance (Kashyap et al., 1993). Duchin et al. (2010) find 
that, faced with tighter monetary policy, which reduces the overall bank loan supply, 
investment will be hampered for firms which lack sufficient capital to fund all profitable 
investment opportunities, and this is more pronounced for bank-dependent firms. Lemmon 
and Roberts (2010) present similar findings that loan supply contraction leads to significant 
decline in net investment for below-investment-grade firms. 
Though these studies explicitly suggest that expansion (contraction) of bank loan supply 
is associated with more (less) bank loan access and corporate investment, the question of 
whether and how such bank loan supply shock influences bank lending and corporate 
investment decisions in emerging markets remains unknown. The focus of this study, 
therefore, is to shed light on this issue to gain an understanding of how bank loan supply 
shock, resulting from the Chinese economic stimulus package, influences bank lending and 
firm investment decisions.  
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The Chinese capital market and credit supply expansion provide an excellent 
environment which cannot be replicated in other countries, such as the US, for the following 
reasons: first, bank loans in China are almost the only external financing resource for firms, 
due to the immature non-bank financing market (Firth et al., 2008; Shen et al., 2014). Thus, 
firms in China are more bank-dependent, which makes them much more sensitive to changes 
in bank loan supply and enables us to examine the influence of bank loan supply shock with 
less concern for endogeneity issues. However, in developed countries such as the US, firms 
are able to switch between the public and private debt markets, which makes examination of 
the effect of bank loan supply shock more difficult. 
Second, the banking system in China is mostly controlled by the government, and that is 
why most bank loans for SOEs are secured, based on economic and political considerations 
rather than pure commercial judgement. In this sense, relative to non-SOEs, SOEs in China 
are more bank-dependent, and thus will be affected more profoundly by changes in bank loan 
supply. Therefore, following an expansion of bank loan supply, access to bank loans for 
SOEs will increase significantly relative to non-SOEs, regardless of their profitability or 
creditworthiness. Once SOEs receive more bank loans, which is related to the stimulus 
package, they invest more, under the pressure of political objectives, irrespective of whether 
they have profitable investment opportunities or not.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that both SOEs and non-SOEs increase their 
bank borrowings significantly following the economic stimulus package. We also find that 
the economic stimulus package results in a weaker connection between newly granted bank 
loans and firm profitability. Additionally, as more bank loans are available, firms are more 
likely to be involved in investment activities and face a weaker relationship between 
investment growth and changes in investment opportunities. All the above phenomena are 
significant in SOEs but not in non-SOEs. As the change in debt financing may also reflect 
firms’ demand for debt, we also follow Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010) to control for firms’ demand side forces and our findings remain the same. 
Our additional analysis further reveals that the influence of the economic stimulus package is 
stronger for non-SOEs from government-favoured industries and regions, and for those with 
political connections, while the influence of the economic stimulus package is stronger for 
SOEs from higher corrupt regions and those controlled by local governments. From the 
perspective of lending institutions, we find that government-owned banks (the big five banks 
and three policy banks) and joint-equity banks increase their lending significantly, while 
foreign banks and non-state owned banks reduce their lending following the economic 
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stimulus package. We also find that the responsiveness of bank lending to firm profitability 
becomes weaker for government-owned banks and joint-equity banks following the economic 
stimulus package. All our above results are robust to a series of further tests that address the 
endogeneity issue or use alternative measurements of key variables.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, as far as we know, 
this paper is the first to explore the financial implications of the economic stimulus package 
and the associated change in monetary policy for bank lending and firm investment decisions 
in an emerging market. We provide evidence that the stimulus package helps the economy 
recover from financial tsunami by encouraging banks to lend and firms to invest, but it 
weakens the relationship between bank lending and firm profitability, and between firm 
investment and investment opportunities. Overall, our results imply that investment by non-
SOEs is crowded out by investment by SOEs, which is backed by the government following 
the implementation of the stimulus package.  
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on the impact of government intervention on 
corporate policy. Literature has documented that SOEs usually have advantage in obtaining 
bank loans and they invest less efficiently (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009; 
Chen et al., 2011), while it is also widely documented that politically connected executives 
facilitate firms’ accessing of bank loans (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003; 
Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006). 
We complement these studies by using the stimulus package as an exogenous shock, and 
revealing a dynamic change of bank loan financing and investment policy in the connected 
firms in comparison with non-connected firms when the monetary policy changes.  
Thirdly, our study is related to the literature on direct government lending through the 
state-owned banking system during the period of the financial crisis. Existing evidence from 
an international study suggests that direct capital infusion by government corrects the 
inefficiency of credit market freezes (Chen et al., 2014), and thus has a beneficial effect at the 
firm level, such as increased stock prices (Tong and Wei, 2012), and more investments 
(Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Lin et al., 2014). Our study shows that, compared to other 
types of banks, the lending decisions of state-owned banks are more sensitive to changes of 
monetary policy. Our study also complements the literature on the impact of government 
ownership on bank lending behaviour. Sapienza (2004) finds that in Italy state-owned banks 
favour large firms and firms located in depressed areas, while our study documents that state-
owned banks lend primarily to SOEs in China and bank lending is less responsive to firm 
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profitability. We believe that the evidence we present constitutes a useful extension to the 
literature, because a government-controlled banking system is a common phenomenon in 
emerging markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic 
stimulus package implemented by the Chinese government and develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the sample and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
discussions. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Economic stimulus package in China 
The global financial crisis has hit China hard, and induced the slowdown in the domestic 
economy in the second half of 2008. In response to the financial crisis, the Chinese 
government announced an economic stimulus package of four trillion RMB (about $586 
billion), which accounts for 12.5% of total GDP in 2008, spending from the fourth quarter 
2008 through to the end of 2010. The stimulus package, which increases investment spending, 
was officially announced on 5
th
 November 2008. Of the total four trillion plan, the central 
government directly funded 1.18 trillion of the investment, which is 30% of the overall 
program, and the rest was funded by local governments and a loosening of monetary policy to 
provide bank credit to support investment (Naughton, 2009). In reality, the disbursement of 
central government stimulus spending includes the following six tranches: 108 billion in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 130 billion, 70 billion, 80 billion and 223.8 billion respectively in the 
first to fourth quarters of 2009, and 992.7 billion in 2010. Altogether, the central government 
input into to the stimulus totalled 1.6 trillion, which is more than what was planned originally.  
Meanwhile, the local governments echoed the central government stimulus program 
actively, which accounted for 70 to 75% of budgetary expenditure on fixed investments. In 
particular, up to the end of 2008, among 31 administrative regions in China, 24 
administrative regions announced investment plans. For example, Yunnan and Liaoning 
provinces announced 3 trillion and 1.3 trillion RMB investment plans, respectively. Table 1 
summarises the economic stimulus plans announced by 24 local governments immediately 
following the economic stimulus package announced by the central government. 
Table 1. Economic stimulus plans announced by local governments 
Provinces Announced plan Provinces Announced plan 
Anhui 389 Jiangsu 950 
Beijing 150 Jilin 400 
Chongqing 1300 Liaoning 1300 
Fujian 216.7 Neimenggu 160 
Guangdong 2300 Shandong 800 
Guangxi 200 Shanghai 500 
7 
 
Guizhou 3000 Shaanxi 206 
Hainan 207 Shanxi 1000 
Hebei 588.9 Sichuan 3000 
Henan 1200 Tianjin 1500 
Hubei 7000 Yunnan 3000 
Hunan 829.2 Zhejiang 350 
Source: http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2008-11/24/content_16813059.htm, accessed 24
th
 November 
2008. All numbers are in billions RMB. 
 
Table 2 lists detailed information of the investment capital distribution. In Panel A, we 
summarise the distribution of the investment capital across priority areas intended by the 
central government for both the initial plan and the revised plan. According to the initial plan 
that was announced by the head of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) in late 2008, 45% of total investment would be awarded to transport and power 
infrastructure and 9.25% to rural village infrastructure. Later on, in early 2009, the NDRC 
revised the economic stimulus plan by reducing the investment in transport and power 
infrastructure and environmental investment from 45% to 37.5% and 8.75% to 5.25%, 
respectively. The proportion of investments in five other areas has been increased slightly 
(see figures in Table 2). In Panel B, we re-summarize the investment capital distribution 
across the industries classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We 
find that new investment has been highly concentrated in more favoured industries (i.e., 
priority-areas) including construction, technology and culture while less favoured industries 
get very little.  
Table 2. Economic stimulus capital disbursement by industries  
 Initial plan  Revised plan  
 Disbursement  Percentage Disbursement  Percentage 
Panel A: Investment distribution by priority-areas announced by NDRC  
Transport and Power infrastructure 
(railroad, road, airport, electricity 
grid) 
1800 45% 1500 37.5% 
Rural village infrastructure 370 9.25% 370 9.25% 
Environmental investment 350 8.75% 210 5.25% 
Affordable housing 280 7% 400 10% 
Technological innovation  
and structural adjustment 
160 4% 370 9.25% 
Health and education 40 1% 150 3.75% 
Post-earthquake construction 1000 25% 1000 25% 
Total 4000 100% 4000 100% 
Panel B: Investment distribution by industry classification according to CSRC 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 
Construction 3450 86.25% 3270 81.75% 
Mining 0 0 0 0 
Manufacture 0 0 0 0 
Public utility 0 0 0 0 
Retailing 0 0 0 0 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 
Technology 160 4% 370 9.25% 
Finance 0 0 0 0 
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Real estate 0 0 0 0 
Public service 0 0 0 0 
Culture 40 1% 150 3.75% 
Conglomerate 350 8.75% 210 5.25% 
Total 4000 100% 4000 100% 
Source: Website of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China, Changyong Wang 
(2009). “Facelift for China’s Economic Stimulus Plan”, 6
th
 March. 
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-06/110114405.html. All numbers are in billions RMB. 
 
2.2 Bank loan supply in China 
Though more favoured industries received most government investment as a result of the 
stimulus package (see figures in Table 2), bank borrowing and firm investments in less 
favoured industries were also influenced by the stimulus package due to the increase of bank 
loan supply following the stimulus package. Bank loan supply in China has increased sharply 
since the stimulus package was announced for the following reasons: (1) the central 
government loosened monetary policy by reducing the benchmark deposit interest rate and 
the bank reserve requirements on deposits (the benchmark deposit interest rate and the bank 
reserve requirements on deposits were adjusted four times in the second half of 2008, 
decreasing from 3.87% to 2.25%, and from 17.5% to 15.5% respectively; They were kept at 
this very low level until the fourth quarter of 2010), both measures increase the money supply 
in hands of banks; and (2) the announcement of the stimulus package sent a very powerful 
signal from the central government to the government-controlled bank system that banks 
should try their best to guarantee the growth of the whole economy. And thus Chinese banks, 
especially the big five banks, which account for more than 75% of market share in terms of 
total deposits in 2008, responded actively by outlining specific policies to support loan 
applications, especially applications from the areas emphasised by the central government
3
. 
Joint-equity banks also announced similar policies to loosen bank loan requirements shortly 
thereafter in the fourth quarter of 2008, causing the new bank credit to grow by 4.2 trillion 
RMB in 2008, and more than double to 9.6 trillion RMB in 2009, and 8 trillion in 2010.  
Figure 1 shows that money supply (M2) and bank loan supply have increased significantly 
since the fourth quarter of 2008, and this expansionary trend lasts to the fourth quarter of 
2013 (the end of our empirical sample). Figure 2 shows that firms’ average bank loan level 
suddenly increased from the fourth quarter of 2008. Though it has been reduced slightly since 
2011, the average level was still higher than that before the announcement of the economic 
stimulus package. This huge increase of bank loan supply has been claimed to have caused a 
                                                          
3
 Although, according to the Commercial Bank Law, the ratio of loans to deposits should be less than 75% for 
commercial banks, there were still a large gap of 3.7 trillion for the big five banks to reach the 75% cap 
(calculation based on the data at the end of November 2008), and governors of the big five banks were all 
confident that they would satisfy government requirements about capital infusion. 
9 
 
number of problems to the whole economy, such as leading to a crowding-out effect over 
investment by non-state-owned firms, due to the fact that most of the increased bank loan 
supply is allocated to state-owned sectors/firms. However, there is still no empirical evidence 
about this type of question. Therefore, this study examines how the increased bank loan 
supply shock has influenced bank lending decisions, how the increased bank loan supply is 
allocated between SOEs and non-SOEs, and whether firms (SOEs/non-SOEs) managed to 
invest the increased funds based on their investment opportunities. 
Figure 1. Quarterly data on money supply and bank loan supply (Unit: 100 million RMB) 
 
This figure depicts the trends of quarterly money supply and bank loan supply over our sample period. Data 
sources: collected and calculated from the website of The People’s Bank of China at: 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/116319/116351/index.html. 
Figure 2. The change of firm bank loan level 
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This figure depicts the quarterly change of firm bank loan level of all sample firms in this study. Data sources: 
collected and calculated from the CSMAR database. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Economic stimulus package and bank loans 
Our first hypothesis relates to the effect of the bank loan supply shock on firms’ debt 
financing decisions. Based on the implicit assumption that external capital is infinitely elastic, 
a firm’s financing decision is solely determined by a firm’s demand for debt (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). However, with the presence of capital market frictions, recent evidence argues 
that the availability of external finance is a key determinant of a firm’s debt financing 
decision (Titman, 2002; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2009). 
In the Chinese capital market, bank loans are the main source of external finance for 
corporations, due to the underdeveloped stock and bond market (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et 
al., 2008). In this sense, firms in China are mostly bank-dependent and the borrowings of 
most firms are supported by bank loans (Firth et al., 2012). Therefore, we expect that the 
bank borrowing of Chinese firms is very sensitive to increased government direct lending 
through the state-owned banking system, following the implementation of the economic 
stimulus package. Economic theories provide two views of how government direct lending 
influences the general economy: the Keynesian view and the neoclassical view. Thus we 
attempt to answer the question of how government direct lending influences corporate 
financing policies based on these two views. 
The Keynesian view suggests that the economic stimulus packages through government 
direct lending are helpful to the whole economy after the financial tsunami. This is because 
commercial banks tend to keep too much precautionary liquidity during the crisis period and 
are thus reluctant to lend, which causes market failure. By imposing government direct 
lending, the government cures the market failure by providing additional liquidity to the 
market and encourages banks to lend (Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Tong and Wei, 2012; 
Chen et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014).  
Following our descriptions in Section 2.2, bank loan supply has grown at an explosive 
pace since the announcement of the stimulus package by the central government, due to 
explicit policies designed to ease provision of credit, which sends a very powerful signal to 
banks that they are expected to rapidly ramp up their lending. Therefore, we expect that the 
bank loans to Chinese firms (both SOEs and non-SOEs) should increase significantly after 
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the implementation of the economic stimulus package and develop our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1a: The economic stimulus package led to more bank loan access for both SOEs and 
non-SOEs. 
Although the increase in government direct lending may stimulate the economy to 
recover from the financial tsunami, the neoclassical view, however, suggests that such direct 
government lending may cause long-term inefficiency in the economy because of the 
incomplete use of government resources, the so-called ‘Keynesian inefficiency’. One type of 
inefficiency caused by increased government direct lending in the Chinese market may be 
that the increased resources are primarily allocated to SOEs  because the state-owned banks 
are inclined to lend to SOEs, following the objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats, to 
serve both political and economic goals (Cull and Xu, 2003; Naughton, 2009). Thus, SOEs’ 
financing policy should be more sensitive to the exogenous shock of bank loan supply, and 
we argue that SOEs are more likely to receive more bank loans regardless of their 
performance and creditworthiness after the introduction of the economic stimulus package.  
However, non-SOEs may be treated differently. As non-SOEs have a short banking 
relationship and face severe information asymmetry with state-owned banks, they are 
discriminated against in getting bank loans. Existing evidence also suggests that the private 
sector survives mainly due to informal financing based on relationships (Allen et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2013), and banks use commercial judgements when deciding to extend credit to 
non-SOEs (Firth et al., 2009). The literature has shown that since the implementation of the 
economic stimulus package, most of the funds have been injected into SOEs for investment 
and the private sector has contracted (Wong, 2011). Therefore we develop our second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1b: After the implementation of the stimulus package, bank loans to SOEs increased 
much more than bank loans to non-SOEs. 
We further expect that the incentive of banks, especially those state-owned banks, to lend 
primarily to SOEs may be enhanced during the financial crisis, when the credit risk is high, 
because they believe the government will provide an implicit guarantee for the debts of SOEs, 
and this implicit guarantee helps to mitigate the credit risk faced by banks. Therefore, banks 
lend the increased capital supply to SOEs without too much consideration about their 
profitability after the implementation of the economic stimulus package, and thus we have the 
following hypothesis.  
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H1c: After the implementation of the stimulus package, bank loans to SOEs became less 
responsive to firm profitability.     
2.3.2 The economic stimulus package and corporate investment 
As discussed above, following the Keynesian economic theory, Chinese firms may be 
reluctant to make investments after the financial tsunami because they have strong incentives 
to hold cash to avoid the liquidity problem. However, the economic stimulus package and the 
associated increased government direct lending may cure the inverse effect of the financial 
crisis on corporate investment by enabling firms to obtain more bank loans. Based on this 
view, we expect that Chinese firms will increase their investment following the 
implementation of the stimulus package.  
However, compared to non-SOEs, investment made by SOEs may increase more 
following the stimulus package due to the fact that SOEs have better access to financial 
resources through increased bank loan supply. Thus we develop the following hypothesis: 
H2a: The economic stimulus package boosted investments by both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
However, after the implementation of the stimulus package, investments by SOEs increased 
much more than investments by non-SOEs. 
Given the fact that SOEs receive more bank loans following the implementation of the 
economic stimulus package, another related question is whether such a stimulus package 
influences firm investment decisions. The aim of the economic stimulus package is to help 
the whole economy to recover through boosting corporate investment, so that both central 
and local governments spare no effort in urging that bank loans should flow through to the 
firm level. For example, the governor of Guangxi province announced that he would 
encourage banks to speed up bank loan disbursement (Guangxi Daily, 2009). As a 
consequence, bank loans derived from the stimulus package are considered as ‘free’ 
resources for firms rather than financial obligations, and this relatively easy access to bank 
loans encourages firms to engage in suboptimal investments and invest more, no matter 
whether their investment opportunities are promising or not. Thus, we conjecture that firm 
investment expenditure will be less responsive to its investment opportunities after the 
implementation of the stimulus package. Furthermore, relative to non-SOEs, SOEs receive 
most of the ‘free’ resources and they are more likely to be influenced by government 
intervention to make investments for government objectives (to push the growth rate of the 
economy) rather than financial objectives, and are thus more likely to be involved in 
investments that are less responsive to investment opportunities. Therefore, we form our 
hypothesis as follows: 
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H2b: After the implementation of the stimulus package, SOEs investments became less 
responsive to investment opportunities. 
2.3.3 The effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment 
decisions across industries and regions 
We next examine whether the influence of the economic stimulus package on bank 
lending and firm investment decisions differs across industries and regions. As we describe in 
Section 2.1 above, there are large variations in capital injection across industries and regions. 
The composition of investments had been directed toward specific industries that would boost 
consumption or have a direct impact on people’s livelihood. As a consequence of government 
directions, bank loans and firm investments were mainly focused on industries such as 
transport and power infrastructure (railways, roads, airports and the electricity grid), rural 
village infrastructure, environment investment, affordable housing, technological innovation 
and health and education. Thus, firms from these industries are more likely to receive 
government-supported bank loans and in turn involve more investment activities. Moreover, 
due to the high degree of politicisation and strong encouragement of bank lending, firms from 
these government-favoured industries will receive more bank loans regardless of their 
profitability. These firms would also invest more without considering investment potential of 
proposed projects (Naughton, 2009).  
In addition, along with the announcement of the economic stimulus package by the 
central government on the 5
th
 November 2008, many local governments also announced their 
own economic stimulus plans to be implemented at the provincial level. In this sense, bank 
loan supply shocks may vary across provinces as unequal amounts of bank loans would be 
injected by each local government. As outlined above, firms from provinces with larger bank 
loans injected will receive more bank loans and invest more. We expect industry and region 
should have a stronger influence on bank lending and firm investment decisions for non-
SOEs because the government policy may help non-SOEs to overcome institutional barriers. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: The influence of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm 
investment decisions was more significant for firms from industries and regions with more 
government-injected capital, especially in non-SOEs. 
2.3.4 The effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment 
decisions in firms with and without political connections 
The above hypotheses have considered the supply side effect on firms’ debt financing, 
namely the change in bank loan supply, and how this response varies across industries and 
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regions. However, the variations in firms’ debt financing and investment decisions are also 
driven by the firms’ demand side forces, and existing literature documents that many of the 
proposed proxies of firm characteristics are correlated with firms’ financial structure and 
investment expenditure decisions. Thus, in this section, we try to explore how firms’ demand 
side force interacts with the supply side force. In particular, we focus on firms’ political 
connections from the demand side perspective. Specifically, an SOE is defined as politically 
connected if any CEO or chairman is a current or former officer in the government or the 
military (Fan et al., 2007); a non-SOE is defined as politically connected if the CEO, 
chairman or largest shareholder is a current or former officer in the government or the 
military. In our sample, about 27% of SOEs are politically connected and 36% of non-SOEs. 
Evidence from emerging markets suggests that firms have a strong incentive to establish 
political connections to seek rents from the government, in the form of more access to bank 
loans (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). In this sense, political connections are a good 
reflection of a firm’s demand for bank loans, all else being equal. Thus, we expect that firms 
with political connections are likely to receive more bank loans. However, we are more 
concerned about the different effects of political connections between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
For SOEs, their banking relationships have already been established because both banks and 
firms are owned by the government and SOEs are preferred by state-owned banks in terms of 
extending credits (Cull and Xu, 2000). In this case, political connections do not provide 
additional benefits for accessing more bank loans. Therefore, the effect of political 
connections in SOEs may be diluted by state ownership (Wu et al., 2012). For non-SOEs, the 
situation could be different. Due to the weaker bank-firm relationship and more severe 
information asymmetry, banks face a higher ex ante cost of collecting non-SOE information 
and ex post cost of monitoring, and are less likely to extend credit to the private sector (Firth 
et al., 2009). Thus, political connections can help non-SOEs to overcome institutional barriers 
to obtain more bank loans (Wu et al., 2012). We thus expect that political connections should 
have a stronger influence on bank lending and firm investment decisions for non-SOEs 
because political connections in non-SOEs can enhance their ability to obtain bank loans 
which can be used for investment. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: The influence of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm 
investment decisions was stronger for non-SOEs with political connections than those 
without. 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
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In this study, quarterly data is applied and firm-level information is obtained from the 
Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR). Our sample starts with all listed 
firms on both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the first quarter of 2003 to the 
fourth quarter of 2013
4
. Initially, we collected a total population of 64,116 firm-quarter 
observations. Following common practice, we deleted 1,311 firm-quarter observations from 
the financial industry and 2,256 firm-quarter observations flagged with ST or ST*. We also 
excluded 4,342 firm-quarter observations with missing information on the variables that are 
used in this study. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level to eliminate the 
outlier effects. Our final sample consists of 1,526 firms and 56,207 firm-quarter observations. 
3.2 Methodology 
Since the economic stimulus package constitutes a nation-wide exogenous shock, we 
establish an equation to explain the determinants of bank loan changes in the spirit of 
Bertrand et al. (2007). This method allows us to explore the dynamic change in firm 
financing policy following the implementation of the stimulus package which is our focus. 
We therefore include a dummy variable Stimulus in our model. We also include a dummy 
variable SOEs to gain an understanding of the potential difference in bank lending incentives 
between SOEs and non-SOEs, and develop the following equation: 
 itititit
itititit
ititititit
IndepBoardPolitical
yTangibilitSizeQROS
SOEsSOEsStimulusStimulusBankLoan

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




1098
761514
3210
                        
                        
*
      (1) 
where ∆BankLoan is the change in bank loans (i.e. net newly granted bank loans) in the 
current quarter. In the empirical analysis, we look into changes in both total bank loans and 
long-term bank loans. Stimulus is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations 
falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. We test H1a by examining Stimulus and expect the coefficient of 
this variable to be significantly positive, and test H1b by examining Stimulus*SOEs and 
expect the coefficient of this interaction term to be significantly positive.   
Consistent with the literature (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we also include 
several control variables in equation (1). ROS is return on sales, which is the proxy for firm 
profitability. Better performing firms are likely to obtain more bank loans, so the coefficient 
is expected to be positive. Q is the value of Tobin’s Q calculated as the ratio of firm market 
value to replacement value, which is used as a proxy for firm investment opportunity (Firth et 
                                                          
4
 We start our sample in 2003 because new accounting and auditing standards were applied in 2002. 
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al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). As firms with better investment opportunities are likely to 
receive more bank loans, we expect a positive coefficient for Q. Size is the natural log of firm 
total assets. Since firms with more collateral assets face less difficulty in getting bank loans, 
we include Tangibility, defined as the ratio of tangible assets to firm total assets, to control 
for collateral information, and we expect a positive coefficient. Political connections are 
helpful in accessing bank loans, so we include Political, defined as a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm is politically connected, and the coefficient is expected to be positive. We also 
include some proxies for corporate governance, which influences bank lending decisions. 
These are Board, measured as the log of the total number of directors on the boards, and 
Indep, measured as the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors on the 
boards. We also include quarter, industry and province fixed effects. Following previous 
studies, we use the one-quarter lag of firm performance and Tobin’s Q in the regression. 
We further examine whether the stimulus package has an impact on bank lending 
decisions for SOEs and non-SOEs, by estimating the following equation for both the SOE 
and non-SOE subsamples, respectively. In accordance with the argument in the literature that 
an optimal lending decision is made if a newly granted bank loan is dependent on a firm’s 
profitability (Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we use the sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to a 
firm’s profitability as the proxy for the bank’s lending decision, where strongly positive 
sensitivity indicates an optimal lending decision. The equation is expressed as follows: 
itit
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In contrast to equation (1), we include one interaction term between Stimulus and ROS to 
test H1c, that is, whether a bank’s lending decision is affected by the implementation of the 
stimulus package. All the other variables are defined in Table 3.  
Regarding firms’ investment decisions, we follow the argument of Bushman et al. (2011) 
to relate firm investment growth to changes in investment opportunities (marginal Q). This 
method has also been applied by other studies (Zheng and Zhu, 2013), and is expressed as 
follows: 
itit
itititit
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where Ln(Iit/Iit-1) is the log of the change in a firm’s investment expenditures in the current 
quarter, the proxy for investment growth. We follow Chen et al. (2011) to measure 
investment expenditure as the ratio of capital expenditure (cash payments for fixed assets, 
intangible assets, and other long-term assets less cash receipts from selling these assets) to 
total assets in the current quarter. Prior studies also applied other proxies for investment, 
which we consider for the robustness tests
5
. RET measures the change in investment 
opportunities (marginal Q), which equals the log of 1 plus lagged industry stock returns. In 
particular, the industry stock returns are measured as the average holding period stock return 
for all sample firms in a specific industry. We estimate equation (3) for the SOE and non-
SOE subsamples. We test H2a by examining Stimulus and expect the coefficient of this 
variable to be significantly positive, and test H2b by examining Stimulus*RET and expect the 
coefficient to be significantly negative only for SOE subsample.  
Following prior studies (Firth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011), we include the following 
control variables. Leverage is defined as the proportion of total debt to total assets. Highly 
leveraged firms pay more interest and have fewer resources for investments, thus we expect a 
negative coefficient for this variable. Income is used to measure internal funds available for 
investments, which is measured as the ratio of net income plus depreciation to total assets. 
Sale is the net sales scaled by total assets. As larger internal funds provide a firm with more 
financial resources for investments, we expect positive coefficients for both Income and Sale. 
We also include quarter, industry and province fixed effects.” All other variables are defined 
as in Table 3. To remain consistent with the existing literature, we use the one-quarter lag of 
leverage and sales level in the regression. Table 3 summarises the definitions of all variables 
used in this study for both univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Table 3. Variables and definitions 
Variable  Definitions 
Stimulus Equals 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period, and 0 for 
the pre-stimulus period. In particular, pre-stimulus period covers 2003 to the third 
quarter of 2008, and post-stimulus period covers the fourth quarter of 2008 to 2013. 
∆Totalloan The change in total bank loans in current quarter 
∆Longloan The change in long-term bank loans in current quarter 
Investment (I) Capital expenditure/Total assets in the current quarter 
Ln(I it/I it-1) The growth of investment expenditure in current quarter 
RET Natural log of 1 plus industry stock return in the current quarter 
ROS Net income/Sales in the current quarter 
Leverage Total debt/Total assets in the current quarter 
Income (Net income + depreciation)/Total assets in the current quarter 
Q Market value/Replacement value in the current quarter 
Size Natural log of total assets in the current quarter 
                                                          
5
 These measures include (1) the ratio of change in net fixed assets plus depreciation to total net fixed assets 
(Pindado et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012) and  (2) net capital expenditure to total assets (Firth et al., 2008). 
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Sale Sales/Total assets in the current quarter 
Tangibility Tangible assets/Total assets in the current quarter 
Board Number of total directors on the boards in the current quarter 
Indep Number of independent directors/Total number of directors on board in the current 
quarter 
Political 
SOEs 
Dummy equals 1 for firms with politically connected executives or large 
shareholders 
Dummy equals 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 for non-state-owned enterprises 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics and univariate test 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of all variables in this study. From the table, we 
observe that the average change in total bank loan ratio is 0.66%, indicating that the bank 
loan ratio increased quarterly. We also observe that the mean of investment growth is 0.02 
and the quarterly investment expenditure is 1.48% of total assets. Moreover, the change in 
investment opportunity is 0.03. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.70 and the median value is 1.32, 
and the average internal funds and sales level are 7.78% and 17.91% of total assets 
respectively, which are similar to the results by Chen et al. (2011). 
Table 4. Summary statistics of all variables 
 Mean Median 25
th
 quartile 75
th
 quartile StD 
∆Totalloan (%) 0.66 0.02 -1.08 2.16 4.98 
∆Longloan (%) 0.25 0 -0.01 2.36 5.53 
Ln(I it/I it-1) 0.02 0.01 -0.66 0.65 1.16 
Totalloan (%) 23.96 23.01 9.97 35.24 20.59 
Longloan (%) 6.56 2.11 0 9.60 8.32 
Investment (%) 1.48 0.75 0.15 2.04 2.35 
RET 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.26 
ROS (%) 3.91 4.53 0.96 10.92 16.59 
Leverage (%) 52.35 51.91 37.24 65.45 0.23 
Income (%) 7.78 3.71 0.13 16.09 2.20 
Tobin’s Q 1.70 1.32 1.06 1.86 1.11 
Size (million) 6,520 2,190 1,040 5,080 4,970 
Sale (%) 17.91 14.56 8.38 23.09 14.07 
Tangibility (%) 27.39 24.32 13.27 39.28 5.71 
Board 9.30 9 9 10 2.00 
Indep (%) 35.79 33.33 33.33 37.50 5.51 
Political 0.31 0 0 1 0.46 
 
Table 5 presents the results of univariate tests, by comparing the change in bank loans 
and corporate investment growth before and after the introduction of the economic stimulus 
package, for the full sample, SOE and non-SOE subsamples. In Panel A, we compare the 
change in bank loans. In the first column for the full sample, we find that the average bank 
loan change is higher after the introduction of the economic stimulus package, and the 
difference is statistically significant (t-value is -2.10). When we split our total sample into 
both SOEs and non-SOEs in columns 2 and 3, we find that this significant difference holds 
for SOEs while the difference in non-SOEs is insignificant. In Panel B, we compare the 
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growth rate of corporate investment, and we find that the investment growth is significantly 
higher for the post-stimulus period, and this difference is also significant for SOEs while 
insignificant for non-SOEs. These univariate tests lend primary support to our hypothesis that 
compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are able to increase their bank loans and investment 
significantly following the bank loan supply shock after the implementation of the stimulus 
package. In the last column in Table 5, we further report the difference-in-difference tests of 
change in bank loans and investment of SOEs and non-SOEs, and before and after the 
introduction of the stimulus package. The statistically and economically significant 
difference-in-difference results confirm that after the introduction of the economic stimulus 
package, both the increase in total bank loans and investment growth are significantly higher 
for SOEs than non-SOEs.  
Table 5. Univariate tests before and after the introduction of the economic stimulus package 
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs Difference (t-value) 
SOE vs. non-SOE 
Panel A: Change in total bank loan ratio 
Before 0.59% 0.62% 0.50% 0.12%*(1.81) 
After 0.73% 0.82% 0.58% 0.24%**(2.52) 
Difference (t-value) 
Before vs. After 
-0.14%**(-2.10) -0.20%**(-2.46) -0.08%(-1.10) -0.12%**(-2.36) 
Panel B: Corporate investment growth 
Before 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.003(0.86) 
After 0.025 0.038 0.018 0.020***(3.11) 
Difference (t-value) 
Before vs. After 
-0.013**(-2.08) -0.024***(-2.43) -0.007(-1.19) -0.017**(-2.23) 
*, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.2 Economic stimulus package, bank lending and firm investment decisions 
4.2.1 Economic stimulus package and change in bank loans at firm level 
In this section, we conduct multivariate analysis in order to provide empirical evidence 
regarding how the increase of monetary supply impacts the change in bank loans using the 
regression model of equation (1). The results are reported in Table 6. In first two columns, we 
apply the change in total bank loans as the dependent variable. We observe from column 1 
that the estimated coefficient on Stimulus is positive and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 
5.19), indicating that after the introduction of the economic stimulus package the average 
quarterly increase of total bank loans is higher than that before the stimulus package. The 
results in column 2 show that the coefficient of interaction term Stimulus*SOEs is also 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that positive relationship between the 
monetary supply shock and change of total bank loans is much stronger in SOEs compared to 
non-SOEs. We also observe the coefficients of ROS are positively and significantly related to 
the quarterly change of total bank loans. For example, in column 1, the coefficient of ROS is 
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0.013. Table 4 shows that the standard deviation for ROS is 0.1659. Hence, a one-standard-
deviation increase in ROS yields a 0.22% increase in total bank loan change. As the mean 
value for total bank loan change is 0.66%, so a one-standard-deviation increase in ROS 
creates 33.3% increase in total bank loan change. In columns 3 and 4, we use the change in 
long-term bank loans as the dependent variable to provide additional evidence and similar 
results are found, indicating that firms, especially SOEs, are able to obtain more long-term 
loans after the introduction of the economic stimulus package. We also find that ROS is also 
positively and significantly related to the change of long-term loans. The coefficient of ROS 
is 0.005, indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in ROS creates 33.2% increase in 
long-term loan change.  
Among the control variables, we observe expected signs consistent with previous studies. 
In particular, firms with political connections are able to obtain more bank loans, though this 
effect is only significant in the total bank loan regression but insignificant in the long-term 
loan regression. The result suggests that firms’ political connections play a more important 
role in financing short-term resources than long-term resources. The possible explanation 
could be that, in our sample, almost 75% of bank loans are short-term which drives the main 
results in the total loan regression (Table 4 shows that the proportion of long-term loan ratio 
to total loan ratio is about 25%). In addition, Zhu et al. (2010) argue that firms from more 
favoured industries are likely to obtain long-term loans. As we have already controlled for 
industry fixed effects, the positive impact of political connections has been diminished. 
Overall, these results are consistent with our hypotheses H1a and H1b that both SOEs and 
non-SOEs are able to obtain more bank loans following the stimulus package, and relative to 
non-SOEs, SOEs’ bank loans increase more significantly. These results suggest that the 
stimulus package and the associated increase of bank loan supply result in a more capital 
allocation towards SOEs. 
Table 6. Effect of the economic stimulus package on the change in bank loans 
Dependent variable:  Change in total bank loans Change in long-term bank loans 
 1 2 3 4 
Stimulus 0.015*** 
(5.19) 
0.013*** 
(5.67) 
0.006*** 
(3.49) 
0.005*** 
(3.74) 
Stimulus*SOEs  0.009** 
(1.98) 
 0.006*** 
(3.45) 
SOEs  0.001* 
(1.82) 
 0.002 
(0.55) 
ROS 0.013*** 
(2.98) 
0.013** 
(2.90) 
0.005** 
(2.43) 
0.005*** 
(2.40) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003*** 
(7.80) 
0.003*** 
(7.81) 
0.002*** 
(2.91) 
0.001*** 
(2.97) 
Size 0.003*** 
(5.25) 
0.003*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(3.65) 
0.003*** 
(2.89) 
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Tangibility 0.005*** 
(2.94) 
0.005*** 
(2.96) 
0.025*** 
(2.90) 
0.025*** 
(2.90) 
Political 0.001** 
(2.12) 
0.001** 
(2.17) 
0.013 
(1.51) 
0.012 
(1.45) 
Board 0.001 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
Indep 0.001 
(1.01) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
Constant -0.017*** 
(-6.97) 
-0.019*** 
(-6.95) 
-0.495*** 
(-11.06) 
-0.481*** 
(-10.49) 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Quarter fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Province fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32 
Observations 56207 56207 56207 56207 
Columns 1 and 2 report the results using the change in total bank loans as the dependent variable. Columns 3 
and 4 report the results using the change in long-term bank loans as the dependent variable. Stimulus is a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. 
SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. ROS is the return on sales. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size is the log of a firm's total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
a firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected. 
Board is the log of the number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of independent directors to total 
directors on the board. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered 
by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Economic stimulus package and bank lending decisions 
In this section, we examine the effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending 
decisions by estimating our equation (2), and report the results in Table 7. Consistent with the 
results in Table 6, the estimated coefficients on Stimulus are all positive and statistically 
significant across three specifications. The interaction term Stimulus*ROS is our main 
concern. In the first column for the full sample, we observe that the estimated coefficient on 
this interaction term is -0.003 and is significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.92), indicating 
that the connection between change of bank loans and firm profitability becomes weaker after 
the introduction of the economic stimulus package. This result indicates that a one-standard-
deviation increase in ROS creates 37.7% increase in total bank loan change before the 
stimulus package, and 30.2% increase in total bank loan change after the introduction of the 
stimulus package. In columns 2 and 3, we partition our total sample into SOEs and non-SOEs. 
In column 2 for the SOEs, we find that the coefficient on Stimulus*ROS is also significantly 
negative with an even larger magnitude (-0.006 vs. -0.003). This result suggests that banks 
are less concerned about SOEs’ profitability when making lending decisions after the 
introduction of the stimulus package, which means that the relationship between bank loans 
and firm profitability becomes weaker for SOEs after the introduction of the stimulus 
package. However, in column 3 for the non-SOEs, this coefficient becomes insignificant, 
though negative, indicating that banks’ lending decision towards non-SOEs is not affected 
22 
 
significantly after the introduction of the stimulus package. The Chow test reveals that 
stimulus package has stronger influence on bank lending decision towards SOEs than non-
SOEs (F = 4.17, p<0.05). Overall, the results in Table 7 support our hypothesis H1c that more 
bank loans were granted to SOEs regardless of their profitability, while non-SOEs have 
experienced no significant change. Among the control variables, we observe that political 
connection is only effective in obtaining more bank loans in non-SOEs, and other control 
variables show coefficients and signs which are consistent with those in Table 6. 
Table 7. Effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending decisions 
Dependent variable:   Change in total bank loans  
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Stimulus 0.015***(5.20) 0.020***(4.82) 0.013*(1.78) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.003*(-1.92) -0.006**(-2.03) -0.001(-0.43) 
ROS 0.015***(8.55) 0.017***(5.62) 0.010***(4.35) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003***(7.80) 0.002***(6.15) 0.004***(4.79) 
Size 0.009***(8.20) 0.009***(5.88) 0.001***(4.14) 
Tangibility 0.005***(3.97) 0.003***(3.72) 0.006***(2.99) 
Political 0.001**(2.16) 0.002(0.27) 0.001**(2.10) 
Board 0.001(0.66) 0.003**(2.22) -0.001(-0.94) 
Indep -0.002(-1.01) -0.002(-0.26) 0.003(0.12) 
Constant -0.024***(-7.68) -0.031***(-5.45) -0.016***(-3.23) 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 
Quarter fixed effect Included Included Included 
Province fixed effect Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.26 0.31 0.18 
Observations 56207 32450 23757 
Chow test   4.17**  
The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of total bank loans to total assets. Stimulus is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. ROS is the 
return on sales. Q is the ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size is the log of firm total assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of a firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm is politically connected. Board is the log of number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of 
independent directors to total directors on the board. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in 
the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS between SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and 
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.2.3 Economic stimulus package and firm investment decisions 
In this section, we estimate equation (3) to examine the effect of the economic stimulus 
package on firm investment decision, measured as the sensitivity of investment growth to the 
change in investment opportunities. Table 8 below shows the estimation results. Across three 
specifications, we observe that the estimated coefficients on Stimulus are all positive and 
statistically significant, and apparently the investment made by SOEs increase more than 
non-SOEs (coefficients are 0.082 and 0.045, respectively). This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis H2a and confirms the positive role played by the economic stimulus package 
during the global financial crisis period in encouraging firms to invest, and SOEs increase 
their investment more significantly than non-SOEs after the introduction of the economic 
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stimulus package. We also find that RET has positive and statistically significant coefficients 
in three specifications, indicating that investment opportunity is an important determinant of 
firm investment regardless of the firm ownership structure. In column 1, the estimated 
coefficient of RET suggests that a 10% increase in investment opportunity results in 0.30% 
increase in investment growth before the stimulus package. The interaction term 
Stimulus*RET is our main concern. In the first column for the full sample, the negative 
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is what we expect, suggesting that after the introduction of the 
economic stimulus package, though firms increase their investment expenditure significantly, 
investment growth becomes less responsive to the change in investment opportunity. In 
column 2 for the SOEs, we find that the coefficient on Stimulus*RET is negative and 
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.63), while in column 3 for the non-SOEs, the 
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is insignificant. The Chow test reveals that the influence of the 
stimulus package is significantly different between SOEs and non-SOEs (F = 7.02, p < 0.01). 
Put together, these results support our main hypothesis H2b that firms’ investment 
expenditure has a weaker connection with investment opportunities after the implementation 
of the stimulus package, which is more pronounced for SOEs than non-SOEs. In addition, the 
empirical results of weaker association between investment growth and investment 
opportunities for SOEs since the stimulus package are also consistent with anecdotal 
observations of overcapacity in some particular industries. For example, at the 2012 China 
Iron forum, Mr Wu Xichun, the President of the China Iron and Steel Industry Association 
(CISA), claimed that the overproduction in the steel industry was a direct result of the 
stimulus package, which led to the loss of firms from this industry, including Bao Gang Gu 
Fen (stock code: 600019)
6
.   
Table 8. Effect of the economic stimulus package on firm investment decisions 
Dependent variable Investment growth 
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Stimulus 0.062***(5.95) 0.082***(3.30) 0.045*(1.78) 
Stimulus*RET -0.027**(-2.25) -0.032***(-2.63) -0.020(-0.65) 
RET 0.030***(4.40) 0.024***(3.06) 0.035***(3.18) 
Leverage -0.036(-1.22) -0.022(-0.93) -0.098***(-2.18) 
Income 0.195(0.77) 0.108(0.59) 0.343(0.68) 
Size 0.034***(8.14) 0.024***(5.61) 0.050***(5.57) 
Sale 0.233**(6.19) 0.287***(6.07) 0.196**(2.48) 
Tangibility 0.089***(4.55) 0.032(1.41) 0.215***(5.02) 
Constant 0.716***(8.33) 0.532***(5.56) 1.027*(6.48) 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 
Quarter fixed effect Included Included Included 
Province fixed effect Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.36 0.41 0.38 
                                                          
6
 Source access: http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20120904/110513040308.shtml 
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Observations 56207 32450 23757 
Chow test   7.02***  
The dependent variable is investment growth. Investment expenditure is defined as the ratio of net capital 
expenditure to total assets. Stimulus is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the 
post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. RET is measured as the log of 1 plus industry stock return. Leverage is the 
ratio of bank loans to total assets. Income is the ratio of internal cash flow to total assets. Size is the log of firm 
total assets. Sale is the ratio of sales to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of a firm’s tangible assets to total 
assets. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*RET between 
SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered 
by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.3 Heterogeneity of bank lending and firm investment decisions  
Analysis so far has shown that stimulus package affects bank lending and firm 
investment decisions which are significant for SOEs. In this section, we move further to 
explore cross sectional variations of the effect of the stimulus package on bank lending and 
firm investment decisions.   
4.3.1 More and less favoured industries 
Firms in our sample operate in different industries and we divide these industries into 
two groups with different levels of government-injected capital, namely industries more or 
less favoured by government. In particular, more favoured industries refer to industries where 
stimulus package-related bank loans are injected, including Construction, Technology, 
Culture and Conglomerate. Empirically, we re-estimate our main regressions for both 
industry groups for SOEs and non-SOEs, and the results are reported in Table 9. 
In Panel A of Table 9, we report the estimation of bank lending decision regression. 
Across four specifications, we observe that the estimated coefficients on ROS are all positive 
and statistically significant, which is consistent with the results from previous tables. As for 
the Stimulus variable, we find that the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant for SOEs and non-SOEs from more favoured industries. This is consistent with 
our argument that average bank loans increase more significantly for SOEs and non-SOEs 
from more favoured industries. An interesting finding is that average bank loans decrease for 
non-SOEs from less favoured industries after the introduction of the economic stimulus 
package. In particular, the estimated coefficient on Stimulus is -0.027, significant at the 10% 
level (t-value is -1.84). The variable of interest to us is Stimulus*ROS. Consistent with our 
predictions, bank lending is less responsive to firm profitability after the introduction of the 
economic stimulus package, which is more pronounced for SOEs and non-SOEs from more 
favoured industries.  
Table 9. Effect of the economic stimulus package across industries 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 More favoured 
industries 
Less favoured 
industries 
More favoured 
industries 
Less favoured 
industries 
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Panel A: Dependent variable is change of bank loans 
Stimulus 0.024***(3.65) 0.016***(4.71) 0.017**(2.60) -0.027*(-1.84) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.009**(-1.97) -0.006*(-1.68) -0.002**(-2.18) -0.002(-0.11) 
ROS 0.018**(2.27) 0.017***(5.53) 0.011***(3.52) 0.008**(2.62) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent 
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
  0.26 0.16 0.45 0.24 
Observations 10839 21611 7910 15847 
Chow test  2.28  4.55**  
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth 
Stimulus 0.158**(2.49) 0.048***(3.43) 0.077***(2.69) 0.043(1.10) 
Stimulus*RET -0.085***(-2.58) -0.027***(-2.91) -0.105*(-1.91) -0.018(-1.26) 
RET 0.003***(3.37) 0.020***(3.07) 0.056*(1.72) 0.027***(3.74) 
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and 
province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.38 
Observations 10839 21611 7910 15847 
Chow test  0.77  2.89*  
This table reports the results of estimation of equation (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs from more and less 
favoured industries. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions 
respectively and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the 
significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from 
more and less favoured industries for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and 
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
In Panel B of Table 9, we report the investment decision estimations. From the results, 
we observe that the average investment growth is significantly higher after the introduction of 
the economic stimulus package, which is economically significant for SOEs from both more 
and less favoured industries (t-values are 2.49 and 3.43 for the Stimulus in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively), and significant at the 1% level for non-SOEs only from the more favoured 
industries (t-value is 2.69 for Stimulus in column 3), while it is insignificant for non-SOEs 
from less favoured industries. Again, the variable of interest is the interaction term 
Stimulus*RET. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on this interaction are significantly 
negative for SOEs from both more and less favoured industries (columns 1 and 2) and non-
SOEs from more favoured industries (column 3), indicating that investment expenditure is 
less responsive to investment opportunities after the introduction of the economic stimulus 
package for these firms. For non-SOEs from less favoured industries, the estimated 
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is insignificant, though negative, indicating that the investment 
decision is not affected by the economic stimulus package. Another interesting observation is 
that with the implementation of the stimulus package, the average investment growth is 
increased for non-SOEs from more favoured industries while insignificant for non-SOEs 
from less favoured industries, confirming the argument that non-SOEs contract from the less 
favoured industries due to lack of funds.  
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4.3.2 More and less favoured regions 
In this section, we conduct analysis regarding the influence of the economic stimulus 
package across regions. In particular, we divide our sample into two groups. One includes 
regions whose stimulus plans are above the median level of the local government stimulus 
plans (more favoured regions) and the rest are included in the other group (less favoured 
regions). In Section 2.1, we have summarised the stimulus plans for 24 local provincial 
governments which explicitly announced the amount of capital injected, while the remaining 
seven local governments did not specify the exact amount of capital injected. Thus, to divide 
our total sample into two groups of more favoured and less favoured regions, we choose the 
15 top-ranked provinces as the more favoured regions and other provinces as the less 
favoured regions
7
. Consistent with the structure in Table 9, we report the estimation results 
for both more favoured regions and less favoured regions and for both SOEs and non-SOEs 
in Table 10.  
Panels A and B present the bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions 
respectively. Not surprisingly, we observe that the average increase in total bank loans and 
investment growth are significantly higher for SOEs and non-SOEs from more favoured 
regions. In addition, the results also show that the relationship between bank loans and firm 
profitability and between firm investment expenditures and investment opportunities become 
weaker after the introduction of the stimulus package, which are significant for SOEs and 
non-SOEs from more favoured regions. 
Overall, all of these results based on industrial and regional heterogeneities are consistent 
with our main hypothesis H3 that the supply side forces, namely the bank loan supply shock, 
shape bank lending behaviour and firm investment policies. Moreover, these effects are 
significant for SOEs, and for non-SOEs from more favoured industries and regions. 
Table 10. Effect of the economic stimulus package across regions 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 More favoured 
regions 
Less favoured 
regions 
More favoured 
regions 
Less favoured 
regions 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans 
Stimulus 0.015**(2.25) 0.029***(3.24) 0.017*(1.93) 0.011(1.60) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.010**(-2.01) -0.004**(-2.75) -0.001**(-2.23) -0.004(-0.93) 
ROS 0.013***(3.63) 0.017***(4.20) 0.012***(3.13) 0.010***(2.58) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent 
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.17 
Observations 16225 16225 11878 11879 
                                                          
7
 Less favoured regions include those provinces that did not specify the amount of capital invested, as we 
conjecture that if the local government wished to infuse a large amount of capital, they would announce it in the 
public media. However, we still conduct robustness tests by excluding these provinces and our main results are 
quantitatively similar. 
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Chow test  0.50  5.02**  
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth 
Stimulus 0.083***(3.46) 0.034**(2.98) 0.170***(6.30) 0.010(0.56) 
Stimulus*RET -0.043**(-1.98) -0.017*(-1.72) -0.052**(-1.98) -0.013(-0.51) 
RET 0.027***(2.16) 0.024**(2.12) 0.048***(2.95) 0.025**(2.65) 
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and 
province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.38 
Observations 16225 16225 11878 11879 
Chow test  2.55  5.25**  
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs from more and less 
favoured regions. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regression respectively 
and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance 
of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from more and less 
favoured regions for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the 
robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.3.3 Firms with and without political connections 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on how bank lending and firm investment 
decisions respond to the economic stimulus package for both SOEs and non-SOEs with and 
without political connections. The results are reported in Table 11, and panels A and B 
present the results of bank lending and firm investment decision regressions. In the first three 
columns, we observe that our previous findings hold for SOEs and non-SOEs with political 
connections. Overall, our findings from Table 11 confirm our hypothesis H4 that the 
influences of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment decisions 
are significant for non-SOEs with political connections, while they do not differ significantly 
for SOEs with and without political connections.  
Table 11. Effect of the economic stimulus package across firms with and without political connections 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Political 
connections 
No political 
connections 
Political 
connections 
No political 
connections 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans 
Stimulus 0.035*(1.91) 0.018***(4.36) 0.017**(2.44) -0.003(-0.28) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.004**(-2.55) -0.005*(-1.94) -0.002**(-2.39) -0.006(-1.04) 
ROS 0.015***(2.74) 0.016***(3.43) 0.010***(2.78) 0.018**(2.50) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent director, industry, 
quarter and province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.18 0.33 0.12 0.26 
Observations 8762 23688 8552 15205 
Chow test  1.00  4.53**  
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth 
Stimulus 0.085***(3.67) 0.040**(2.01) 0.095***(4.77) 0.033(1.29) 
Stimulus*RET -0.031**(-2.08) -0.010**(-2.55) -0.033*(-1.80) -0.010(-1.20) 
RET 0.030***(3.68) 0.001*(1.85) 0.041***(2.91) 0.007(0.51) 
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and 
province fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.35 0.40 0.36 0.41 
Observations 8762 23688 8552 15205 
Chow test  0.33  3.13*  
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs with and without 
political connections. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions 
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respectively and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the 
significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms with 
and without political connections for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and 
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.4 Additional analysis 
In this section, we conduct a set of additional analysis to further support our main 
arguments. The first analysis relates to the heterogeneity within SOEs from the points of 
views of regional corruption levels and SOE ultimate owner types. The second analysis 
focuses on the market reactions towards the announcement of stimulus package. The third 
analysis aims to explore the heterogeneity of bank lending decisions based on lender types. 
4.4.1 The influence of stimulus package for SOEs in regions with different levels of 
corruption and different ultimate owners 
Previous analysis has shown that there is no significant variation in government bank 
lending towards SOEs. Nevertheless, the influence of stimulus package on SOEs may not be 
homogeneous. This subsection aims to provide some additional evidence to examine the 
heterogeneity of bank lending and firm investment decisions for SOEs from the perspectives 
of regional corruption level and SOE ultimate owner types.  
Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, Chen et al. (2014) document that in countries 
with low corruption, government bank lending is more efficient, which can improve bank 
performance and stabilize the economy during financial crises, while they observe the 
opposite phenomenon in countries with high corruption. In their spirit, we exploit the 
variations in the level of regional corruption in China to test whether, and to what extent, the 
regional corruption levels have an impact on government bank lending towards SOEs. In 
particular in regions with high corruption, SOE managers are likely to collude with managers 
of state-owned banks, which leads to the pursuit of empire-building and higher agency costs, 
due to insufficient monitoring by the state controlling shareholders (Firth et al., 2008). Thus, 
it is expected that the influence of the stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment 
decisions will be more significant for SOEs located in regions with high corruption.     
To conduct the regression analysis, we first construct a corruption index to differentiate 
regions of high and low corruption, and assign regions to the high corruption category if their 
corruption index is above the median level of the corruption index for a given year
8
. Then, we 
                                                          
8
 To construct the regional corruption index, we collect the following information for each province in each year 
during our sample from the China Procuratorial Yearbook. We first count the number of duty crime cases, and 
then we count the number of government officials involved in these cases and the total number of government 
29 
 
divide our sample firms into two groups based on whether they are located in regions of high 
or low corruption, and estimate our main regressions for each group. Table 12 reports the 
results and our interest is in the interaction terms (Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET). 
Consistent with our predictions, we observe that the coefficients of these interaction terms are 
more significant and have greater magnitude for SOEs located in the regions of high 
corruption. This finding is consistent with the argument of Chen et al. (2014) that government 
bank lending is less efficient in areas of high corruption. 
Table 12 Effect of the economic stimulus package in regions with high and low corruption (SOE sample) 
 High corruption regions Low corruption regions 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans 
Stimulus 0.016***(3.42) 0.023**(2.16) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.007**(-2.28) -0.003(-0.60) 
ROS 0.015***(4.05) 0.018***(4.23) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent 
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
  0.38 0.26 
Observations 16225 16225 
Chow test 5.25**  
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth 
Stimulus 0.087***(2.87) 0.053***(3.08) 
Stimulus*RET -0.056**(-2.44) -0.023(-1.23) 
RET 0.032**(1.96) 0.023***(2.77) 
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and 
province fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
 0.38 0.38 
Observations 16225 16225 
Chow test 4.01**  
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs from high and low corruption 
regions. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions respectively and all 
the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance of the 
difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from high and low 
corruption regions. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered by 
firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
In addition, the ultimate owner of SOEs can be either the central government or a local 
government, which may also alter the influence of stimulus package, because the central 
government and local governments have different objectives for retaining ownership in SOEs. 
Specifically, in the case of central SOEs, the aim is to maintain control over key industries 
and guarantee the safety of the national economy, while in case of local SOEs, the aim is to 
increase local GDP and reduce local unemployment (Jin et al., 2005). Wu et al. (2012) argue 
that compared with central SOEs, local SOEs are subject to severe government intervention. 
Wang et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence to support the argument 
that central SOEs and local SOEs have different incentives. In the light of this, we repeat the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
officials. Then, we calculate the corruption index as the ratio of corrupt officials to total officials for each 
province in each year. 
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above analysis for both central and local SOEs to investigate whether the influence of the 
stimulus package is different for each of these two groups of firms. The results reported in 
Table 13 show that our previous findings for SOEs are mainly driven by local SOEs, 
reflected by significant interaction terms in both panels, indicating that the stimulus package 
influences the bank lending and firm investment decisions of local SOEs relative to central 
SOEs. This finding is consistent with the previous argument that local SOEs are subject to 
more severe government intervention.  
Table 13 Effect of the economic stimulus package in central SOEs and local SOEs 
 Central SOEs Local SOEs 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans 
Stimulus 0.014***(4.17) 0.025***(7.62) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.007(-1.07) -0.004**(-2.38) 
ROS 0.019***(3.52) 0.008**(2.84) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent 
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
  0.27 0.26 
Observations 11799 20651 
Chow test 4.77**  
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth 
Stimulus 0.085***(5.05) 0.048***(5.66) 
Stimulus*RET -0.061*(-1.90) -0.024**(-2.17) 
RET 0.033*(1.89) 0.022***(3.18) 
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and 
province fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
 0.41 0.39 
Observations 11799 20651 
Chow test 2.93*  
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for central SOEs and local SOEs. Panels A 
and B represent both bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions and all the variables are defined as 
in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance of the difference in the coefficients 
on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between central SOEs and local SOEs. The T-statistics are in 
parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Market reaction to the announcement of the economic stimulus package 
Analyses so far have shown that, from the firms’ perspective, the influence of the 
stimulus package varies according to the ownership structure and institutional environment. 
In this section, we examine the influence of the stimulus package from the investors’ 
perspective. The purpose of this examination is to see whether investors in the secondary 
market are able to identify the value implications of the stimulus package announcement. If 
the stimulus package is likely to influence bank lending and firm investment decisions as we 
documented before, investors will discount this announcement. Specifically, the 
announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the announcement using the market-adjusted excess return model. We choose two 
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days in the event window (0, +1), and 230 days as the estimation window (-240, -10). Our 
CAR calculation is consistent with the method applied by Huang et al. (2012).  
Empirically, we regress CARs against ownership structure and institutional environment 
proxies and report the results in Table 14. All independent variables are from the quarter 
before the announcement, following Huang et al. (2012). In column 1, the coefficient of SOE 
is -0.007 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -1.97), indicating that 
investors feel pessimistic about the stimulus package for SOEs, which is consistent with our 
previous findings for SOEs. Columns 2 to 4 report the investor reaction for both SOEs and 
non-SOEs from different industries or different institutional environments and the results are 
consistent with our findings in the above subsections. For example in column 2, the 
coefficient of Favoured industry dummy is -0.010 and significant at the 5% level (t-value is -
2.17). This result indicates that for non-SOEs from more favoured industries (when the SOE 
dummy equals 0, the coefficient of Favoured industry dummy represents the market reaction 
to non-SOEs from favoured industries), the stock price within the first day window is 1% 
lower than for those non-SOEs from less favoured industries, consistent with our previous 
findings in Table 9 that the stimulus package influences bank lending and firm investment 
decisions for non-SOEs from more favoured industries. Overall, the results from the event 
study are consistent with our previous findings and support our hypotheses. 
Table 14 Effects of ownership and institutional environment on CARs around stimulus package 
announcement 
Dependent variable is the two-day CARs around stimulus package announcement 
SOE -0.007** 
(-1.97) 
-0.007** 
(-2.05) 
-0.009* 
(-1.83) 
-0.007* 
(-1.93) 
SOE*Favoured industry dummy  -0.007 
(-0.47) 
  
SOE*Favoured region dummy   -0.007 
(-1.31) 
 
SOE*Political connection dummy    -0.002 
(-0.28) 
Favoured industry dummy  -0.010** 
(-2.17) 
  
Favoured region dummy   -0.015*** 
(-3.03) 
 
Political connection dummy    -0.005* 
(-1.73) 
Control variables included in the regressions are return on sales, Tobin’s Q, leverage, income, tangible assets, 
board size and independent director ratio.  
Adjusted R
2
 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Observations 1297 1297 1297 1297 
This table reports the results of the market reaction to the announcement of the stimulus package for firms with 
different ownership structure from different industries or institutional environments. The dependent variable is 
the two-day CARs around the announcement of the stimulus package. The T-statistics are in parentheses and 
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.3 The influence of stimulus package based on lender types 
In this section, we divide banks into different groups and examine how bank ownership 
heterogeneities affect their lending decisions. In particular, we divide all banks that extend 
credit to our sample firms into the following four groups, namely, government-owned banks 
(this group includes the big five banks and three policy banks), city commercial banks, joint-
equity banks (this group includes joint-equity commercial banks and their affiliated 
institutions), and non-state owned bank (this group includes foreign banks and other non-state 
owned joint-equity banks). Two classifications need to be noticed. First, the Communication 
Bank is categorized as one of big five government-owned banks. Second, four joint-equity 
banks (Minsheng bank, Pingan bank, Zheshang bank and Hengfeng banks) are classified as 
non-state owned banks due to their largest shareholder is not the Chinese government, though 
the nomination of Chairman needs to be approved by the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (see Appendix 1 for the guideline of our classification). Then we estimate our 
main regression for each group and report the results in Table 15. In this analysis, we apply 
the bank loan level data for regression estimation. Initially, we are able to collect 2,531 bank 
loans. Then we delete 83 loans with missing information on the loans, 408 loans due to 
unclassified bank types, and finally have 2,040 loans for analysis.  
From Table 15, we observe that the average newly granted bank loans becomes 
significantly larger after the introduction of the economic stimulus package for government-
owned bank and joint-equity bank groups, while significantly smaller for non-state owned 
bank group. This result is consistent with the evidence from developed markets that private 
bank lending decreases significantly during the financial crisis period (Leary, 2009; Lemmon 
and Roberts, 2010; Lin et al., 2014). These results confirm our previous argument that direct 
government lending is implemented through the state-owned banking system, while other 
creditor lending declines. We also observe that the estimated coefficients of ROS are only 
statistically significant in the city commercial banks and non-state owned banks groups, 
indicating that commercial judgement is only applied by city commercial banks and non-state 
owned banks. Most importantly, we find that the interaction terms show significantly 
negative coefficients for government-owned bank and joint-equity bank groups, suggesting 
that lending decisions of government owned banks and joint-equity banks have been 
significantly influenced by the economic stimulus package. In addition, the bank lending 
decision is enhanced for non-state owned banks, reflected by a positive though insignificant 
estimated coefficient on the Stimulus*ROS term.  
Table 15 Effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending decisions by bank types 
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Dependent variable Newly granted bank loans scaled by total assets 
 1.Government 
owned banks 
2.City commercial 
banks 
3.Joint-equity banks 4.Non-state 
owned banks 
Stimulus 0.031*** 
(2.89) 
-0.008 
(-1.05) 
0.005* 
(1.94) 
-0.033*** 
(-2.60) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.018*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.025 
(-0.80) 
-0.080*** 
(-2.86) 
0.068 
(1.44) 
ROS -0.031 
(-1.19) 
0.034** 
(2.43) 
0.010 
(0.78) 
0.026** 
(1.98) 
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent 
director ratio, industry and year fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.25 
Observation 1105 177 518  240 
Chow test 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 1 vs 4 2 vs 3 2 vs 4 3 vs 4 
 5.13** 0.86 5.78** 5.66** 1.60 6.65*** 
This table reports the results of bank lending decisions using bank loan level data by dividing our total sample 
into four groups based on lending institutions. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in the 
coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS between each pairs of sub-samples. T-statistics are in parentheses and 
computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
4.5.1 Endogeneity 
One concern about our results on the influence of the stimulus package on bank lending 
decisions and firm investment efficiencies is endogeneity, due to endogenous regressors and 
unobserved heterogeneities. For example, in our bank lending decision model, firm 
profitability is likely to be determined by other independent variables, so that it is 
endogenously determined. In addition in our investment decision model, investment 
opportunities are also likely to be correlated with leverage. To address the endogeneity of 
regressors, we apply the first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as an 
alternative to check the robustness of our results. The use of GMM can also account for 
unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant firm characteristics, as developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). To apply this method, we first add a one period lag of dependent variable 
on the right hand to account for any possible dynamic endogeneity (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). Then, we assume all our independent variables, except quarter dummies, are 
potentially endogenous, which means that there may be some forms of persistence in our 
independent variables such as ROS and RET. Thus we use two and three period lags of all 
potential endogenous independent variables as instruments in our regression models.  
Table 16 reports the estimation results of both bank lending and firm investment 
decisions equations. As we use the differenced GMM with the lagged dependent variables as 
the explanatory variables, it is noted that the observations of both equations are smaller than 
the full sample. In addition, as we use different independent variables in both equations, the 
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observations for both regressions are slightly different. The signs of estimated coefficients of 
our key variables are the same as those in previous tables, which confirms the robustness of 
our main findings. In addition, we observe that, after controlling for the potential endogeneity 
of all regressors, the magnitudes of coefficients are even larger. The Hansen tests (p-values) 
are both larger than 0.1, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that instrumental 
variables are exogenous. We also report the first and second-order auto-correlation tests. 
These results suggest that residuals are correlated at the first order but not at the second order.   
Table 16 Bank lending and firm investment decisions equations (GMM estimation)  
 Bank lending decisions equation Firm investment decisions equation 
Stimulus 0.605***(2.66) 0.218**(2.42) 
Stimulus*ROS -0.117***(-2.65)  
ROS 0.114***(4.47)  
Stimulus*RET  -0.386***(-2.61) 
RET  0.107**(2.27) 
Lagged dependent variable and other control variables in equation (2) and (3) are also included in each 
regression. 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.46 0.58 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.01 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.74 0.81 
Observations 51437 52240 
This table reports the estimation results of our equation (2) and (3) using the first-difference GMM. The T-
statistics are in parentheses and computed using the two-step robust, firm-clustered standard error by 
incorporating the small-sample correction; ** and *** indicate the significance levels at the 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.5.2 Other robustness tests 
To complement previous analysis from firms’ perspective, we conduct event study to 
examine the influence of stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment decisions 
from investors’ perspective. To do so, we compare the CARs for bank loans and mergers and 
acquisitions announcements before and after the implementation of stimulus package. The 
unreported results show that CARs for bank loans and mergers and acquisitions 
announcements are significantly lower for SOEs after the introduction of the stimulus 
package, which is consistent with our previous arguments.  
In the prior analysis we have used the Stimulus dummy variable to indicate the economic 
stimulus package period. One concern is that it may be a bit too noisy because it may also 
incorporate information other than the government stimulus package implemented in China. 
Moreover, using the dummy variable can only reflect the static process, which ignores the 
dynamic trend. In this sense, we create an alternative proxy for the economic stimulus 
package policy, which is a continuous variable defined as the ratio of quarterly change in 
bank loan supply to the bank loan supply of the last quarter.  
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Our next robustness test relates to the identification of bank loan supply expansion 
periods. Shen et al. (2014) define the period between the fourth quarter of 2008 and fourth 
quarter of 2010 as the capital expansion period. In their spirit, we conduct two additional 
regression analysis by (1) re-defining Stimulus dummy to be consistent with Shen et al. 
(2014), and (2) deleting the period between the fourth quarter of 2008 and fourth quarter of 
2010 from our sample.  
We further conduct robustness check by applying alternative measurement of investment 
opportunities in our bank loan equations (1) and (2). As argued by Almeida and Campello 
(2007), the information about investment opportunities is captured by other variables such as 
cash flows if the firm is seen as financially constrained, and in this sense Tobin’s Q is a 
comparatively poorer proxy for investment opportunities
9
. To address this concern, we use 
the growth rate of sales level as an alternative proxy for investment opportunities following 
Nash et al. (2003), and re-estimate our bank loan equations. Additionally, we also repeat the 
bank loan equation estimation using the bank loan level data for robustness check. All of 
above robustness test results remain quantitatively similar to the main results reported in 
previous tables, which confirm that our main findings are robust for alternative measurements. 
To save the space, we do not report the results of this section but they are available on request.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of how the supply-side shock of bank loans affects bank 
lending and firm investment decisions. The implementation of the Chinese economic 
stimulus package and the related expansion of bank loan supply are used as a laboratory to 
test our hypotheses. Primarily, we find that the implementation of the stimulus package after 
the financial tsunami enables both SOEs and non-SOEs to gain better access to bank loans 
and encourage them to make more investment, which is helpful for economic recovery. 
However, the economic stimulus package results in weaker relationships between bank loans 
and firm profitability and between investment expenditure and investment opportunities, 
especially in local SOEs, SOEs from high corruption regions, non-SOEs from more favoured 
industries and regions, and non-SOEs with political connections. Our main findings are 
robust to corrections for endogeneity and alternative measurements. 
Overall, our findings suggest that, contrary to developed countries such as Japan, where 
government direct lending effectively corrects the inefficiency of credit market freezes and 
has a beneficial effect at the firm level (Lin et al., 2014), the increased bank loan supply and 
                                                          
9
 We appreciate the associate editor’s comment for pointing out this issue.  
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government lending in China, where the government owns SOEs as well as a majority of 
banks, are mainly allocated to SOEs rather than non-SOEs. Moreover, SOE investments are 
less related to investment opportunities because newly granted loans are less connected with 
firm profitability. This being the case, we reveal the economic consequence of stimulus 
packages in emerging markets.  
 
 
Appendix 1. Classification of bank types 
Government-owned banks These include Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank of China, 
Communication Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China (1994), 
The Export-Import Bank of China (1994), China Development Bank 
(1994). 
City commercial banks These include 136 commercial banks at city levels. The top 10 city 
commercial banks include Shanghai Bank, Jiangsu Bank, Beijing 
Agriculture Commercial Bank, Chongqing Agriculture Commercial Bank, 
Shanghai Agriculture Commercial Bank, Nanjing Bank, Guangzhou 
Agriculture Commercial Bank, Ningbo Bank, Hongzhou Bank, and Tianjin 
Bank. 
Joint-equity banks These include China Merchants Bank (1988), China Citic Bank (1988), 
China Everbright Bank (1992), Huaxia Bank (1992), Industrial Bank 
(1988), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (1992), China Guangfa Bank 
(1988), Bohai Bank (2005). 
Non-state owned banks These include foreign banks operating on the mainland of China and non-
state owned banks whose largest shareholder is not Chinese government. 
Which include Beijing Bank and four joint-equity banks (Minsheng bank, 
Pingan bank, Zheshang bank and Hengfeng banks).  
Figures in brackets are the year of the establishment of banks. 
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